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Introduction
The Long Range Strike Bomber (LRSB) fleet is a legacy left behind 
by the Cold War era when trans-regional and inter-continental range 
bombers were part of the nuclear triad. The United States (US) and 
Soviet Union maintained LRSBs primarily to support nuclear missions 
but during the height of the Cold War, these bombers were also kept 
ready for conventional missions. China has been working for long to 
develop LRSBs to put in place a credible nuclear triad. 
China has redefined its strategic boundaries and is asserting to 
break the myth of the ‘first and second island chains’ to project power 
beyond these geographical bottlenecks through maritime and air 
power. The strategic bombers give China flexibility to gain access to the 
Western Pacific and north-south movement along the Asian seaboard to 
complement its Anti-Access/Area Denial (AA/AD) strategy.1 In view 
of this, the modernised H-6K bomber of China has a combat radius of 
roughly 2,200 miles (3,541 km), just adequate to reach the proximity 
of Guam, the US maritime base. 2 The H-6K was designed primarily 
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as a cruise missile carrier. The bomber is considered to be purely for 
conventional use rather than as part of the nuclear triad. It can carry six 
CJ-10K or YJ-12 long-range land attack and anti-ship cruise missiles on 
its wings and potentially several more inside its weapon bays. That makes 
it a threat to not only the US and allied shipping, but also to bases on 
the islands and the mainland.3 After years of speculation, the People’s 
Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) Commander, General Ma Xiaotian, 
publicly confirmed in September 2016 that China was developing a “next 
generation, long-range strike bomber”.4 
This will be accomplished by designing the H-20 in the flying wing 
layout to mirror the stealth advantages that the US and next-generation 
Russian bombers derive from this configuration.5 Second, the bomber will 
be capable of conducting “ultra-long range” missions. The new bomber 
(H-20) has an intercontinental flying range of more than 10,000 km and 
combat radius of over 5,000 km.6 Stealth technology continues to play 
a key role in the development of these new bombers, which probably 
will reach initial operational capability by 2025.7 In view of this, there 
is a need to examine the current and future capabilities of the LRSBs of 
China to assess the implications in the Western Pacific and the Indian 
Ocean Region (IOR). 
Strategic Signalling 
The 2018 RAND Report notes that in 2015, the PLAAF flew the LRSB 
that was described as a major milestone of breaking through the first and 
second chains of islands and flying into the Western Pacific region.8 It 
was a departure from the defensive approach to an assertive PLAAF that 
carried out combat air patrols over disputed territories in the South China 
Sea including the Fiery Cross Reef, Scarborough Shoal, Mischief Reef 
and Woody Island.9 These flights were a demonstration of the PLAAF’s 
willingness to challenge the US and its allies in the region and to break 
the geographical and strategic containment in the Western Pacific Ocean. 
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The decision to publicise the PLAAF’s flights in the South China Sea was 
significant because of the message being conveyed to both the internal 
and external audience.10
Furthermore, the RAND report also flags certain important implications 
of these flights over the first and second chains of islands and Western 
Pacific Ocean. The report suggests it to be a strategic signalling; a step 
towards making the PLAAF a world class force to deal with future security 
challenges and an indication that China is acquiring capabilities to bring the 
US strategic locations in the Pacific Ocean within the range of its LRSBs. 
Therefore, the US needs to take all possible measures to dissuade China 
from such a coercive policy and also build consensus among its regional 
allies to mitigate the negative impacts of these flights undermining the US 
policy of containment of China within the first and second chains of islands.
China has demonstrated the ability to conduct over the sea operations 
against any perceived encirclement or containment by regional and extra-
regional powers. This is also a direct message to the US and its regional 
allies that it is now capable of employing LRSBs if Chinese sovereignty is 
questioned over the disputed territories in the South China Sea and East 
China Sea. At the same time, China will continue to develop capabilities 
to bring the US island territories of Guam and Hawaii within the range 
of the LRSBs in the near future. It could also be a signal that China will 
be in a position to establish the Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) 
over the disputed territories as soon as it is confident of its capabilities to 
use force against nations that violate the ADIZ.
With the increasing Chinese economic activities across Asia, Africa 
and island countries in the IOR, China will be compelled to increase its 
military footprints to protect Chinese strategic and economic interests. 
Therefore, China would require power projection capabilities to secure 
its interest. China may create maritime and land bases in the littoral states 
in the IOR, however, this would require long range bombers to assert 
its dominance and capabilities. Long range bombers comprise not only 
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a platform for power projection but also for dual usage of integration 
of nuclear and conventional capabilities. The PLAAF claims that the 
LRSB remains vulnerable at this critical juncture and, thus, there is a 
need to move from quantitative accumulation to qualitative change and 
from being a big force to a strong force.”11 Furthermore, it argues, “The 
new-generation LRSB will considerably improve China’s strategic attack 
capability and make the PLAAF a strategic air force in the true sense.”12
The major lesson that China has conveyed through its policy of 
increasing LRSB flights is that the policy of the US to contain China 
within the first and second chains of islands is now a fatigued idea. China 
cannot be contained militarily by the US or its allies on land, sea and even 
air. The PLA Navy is already in the process of achieving power projection 
capabilities and now it is the turn of the PLAAF to be strengthened and 
converted into a “strategic air force” status. What the US and allies must 
do is develop the capability to mitigate the threat by developing systems 
and synergy among allies to ensure that any long range flights either by 
the H-6K or, in future, the H-20, remain vulnerable to ground, air and 
sea-based air defence systems. From an institutional perspective, the PLA 
Rocket Force (PLARF) of China continues to remain the “core force for 
strategic deterrence”.13 The LRSB is not a replacement for the nuclear 
capable missile but will give options to China for using the air in addition 
to the land-based and sea-based nuclear and conventional missiles. 
Limitations of Current Long Range Bombers of China
The concerns for China with regard to its LRSBs is that the current range 
limitations of PLAAF fighters would mean that the H-6Ks on trans-
regional missions would not have fighters to defend them and would, 
therefore, “be easy targets for American, Japanese, and Taiwanese air 
defenders before they could get within range of Guam.”14 The range of 
the current fleet remains limited due to inadequate refuelling facilities in 
mid-air or bases on land. Another issue related with range is that even 
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if refuelling is carried out, the surprise and stealth of the mission gets 
compromised because the refuelling aircraft may not be able to hide the 
radar signatures and, thus, will become an easy target for air defence 
forces. Moreover, China is yet to master the technology of stealth and, 
as a result, the US bases along the “first and second chain of islands” 
continue to act as deterrence for over the sea operations. Currently, the 
US has the Aegis and Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD)
missile defences in Guam and at its Japanese bases, which pose a threat to 
China’s fleet of missiles and LRSBs. The US has no established defence 
against a stealth bomber, which China will seek to exploit with the H-20.15 
However, the H-6K fleet, in the absence of air defence and electronic 
warfare escort, remains vulnerable to the US air, ground and sea-based 
air defence. China does not have the maritime or carrier battle group 
support for long range bombers in terms of air defence in the open sea. 
China may have psychologically bounced the “first and second chains 
of islands” by flying over the sea, but to presume that it will be able 
to enforce AA/AD in the South China Sea and Western Pacific region 
is still a far cry. China is yet to develop it as a comprehensive system 
of systems that can deal with multiple challenges from the air, ground 
and sea, including kinetic and non-kinetic threats. The new aircraft of 
China will necessitate development of significant defensive capabilities, in 
particular with regard to the Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage and Assess 
(F2T2EA) process.16 Moreover, the potential for the regional bomber to 
be employed in a deep, offensive counter-air role would likely necessitate 
the diversion of allied 5th generation aircraft from offensive operations 
to defend high-value assets.17 With the current available capabilities of the 
PLAAF, it is not possible for China to engage and divert the US stealth 
long range bombers and 5th generation aircraft, thus, employment of the 
H-6K or H-20 against the US and its allies may be fraught with risk in the 
absence of a credible air defence system that is able to deny penetration of 
US missiles and aircraft. 
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The PLAAF “does not currently have a nuclear mission”.18 The 
biggest capability gap in the LRSB is that it is incapable of penetrating 
through the air defence of the US and its allies along the first and second 
chains of island. Thus, these flights can at best be described as strategic 
signalling, training and dry rehearsals so that, in the future when the 
nuclear capable stealth long range bombers are introduced, the PLAAF is 
ready to operate them as part of the nuclear triad. 
Implications for India
The new-generation LRSB will considerably improve China’s strategic 
attack capability and make the PLAAF a strategic air force in the true sense. 
China’s quest for the LRSB is not exclusively to break the encirclement/
containment along the “first and second chains of islands” but also to 
bring the IOR and Australia within the range of the H-20. It will have 
security implications for India in the land, air and maritime domains. If 
deployed in mainland China, the range of the H-20 is sufficient to cover 
Japan, the Korean peninsula (if operating from Hainan), the South China 
Sea and the northern halves of Sumatra and Borneo plus the entirety of 
the Philippines; and from western or southern China, much of India and 
the Bay of Bengal.19 With the stated capabilities of the H-20, China will 
be in a position to extend its reach to all of India, the island territories 
including the Andaman & Nicobar and Lakshadweep Islands. The threat 
is not from the range but the stealth technology that is central to the 
development of the regional bomber (H-20) and it will employ many 
5th generation fighter technologies that include an Active Electronically 
Scanned Array (AESA) radar and be capable of delivering precision-
guided munitions.20 
Considering the threat China’s LRSBs will pose to India by 2025, 
there is an urgent need to assess the strategic and operational implications, 
especially at a time when the Indian Air Force does not have credible 
surveillance and air defence capabilities to engage stealth bombers. The 
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threat of the LRSBs is more in the strategic realm than in the operational 
or tactical domain. It will threaten India’s critical military and non-
military assets on land, sea and island territories. India not only requires 
dissuasive capability by developing credible air defence against stealth 
technology but will also need LRSBs to strike back with equal intensity, 
should the situation so warrant. In any case, India requires the LRSBs to 
possess a credible nuclear triad and a system that is dual purpose (nuclear 
and conventional) and multi-role to perform the task of ground attack, 
anti-ship, air defence (air-to-air missiles) electronic warfare and airborne 
early warning long range radar. 
Conclusion
China is more focussed to make the Air Force a strategic force that has 
regional and intercontinental range. It gives China another option as far 
as nuclear triad is concerned, however, the PLARF remains the main-
stay of China’s strategic deterrence. China is making formidable strides 
in logistical and technological advancements in building the LRSBs, 
however, it still lacks combat experience, whereas the B-52 long range 
bombers of the US has been in service since 1955. That could prove to 
be its greatest hindrance to implement a successful long-range bomber 
strategy. “Today, China’s military has an increasingly impressive high-
tech arsenal, but its ability to use these weapons and equipment remains 
unclear. According to Timothy R. Heath, the Army (PLA) struggles 
under the legacy of an obsolete command system, rampant corruption, 
and training of debatable realism, among other issues.”21 The editor-in-
chief of the defence journal is sceptical about China’s abilities to produce 
a modern long-range stealth strike bomber in a short period, considering 
that it would require “a state-of-the-art structure and aerodynamic 
configuration as well as a high-performance turbofan engine”.22 There 
may be doubts about China in achieving technical capabilities, given the 
ambitious timelines to make the H-20 operational by 2025. However, 
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the reorganised People’s Libertion Army (PLA) is certainly becoming 
more professional and focussed in the approach to achieve operational 
efficiency. The H-6K flights over the Western Pacific should be seen in the 
light of testing conceptual and training aspects so that when these flights 
are undertaken to implement the AA/AD or ADIZ, the PLAAF is not 
found wanting. 
The development of the H-20 as the LRSB should not be seen only 
as a weapon system against the US—India is equally a potential target 
of this strategic weapon system. India can no longer afford to delay and 
defer building resilient air defence capabilities, keeping in mind the threat 
LRSBs will pose to our critical assets based on land, island territories and 
even carrier battle groups. The need for adding LRSBs in the Indian Air 
Force arsenal is imperative and undeniable. 
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